Bava Kamma 58

Chapter 58

א ורבי יוחנן אמר לאחר נפילה מחלוקת

1 R. Johanan, however, said: 'It is regarding damage occasioned after the fall [of the pitcher] that there is a difference of opinion.' But how in the case of damage done at the time of the fall? Would there be unanimity [granting] exemption? Surely R. Johanan's statement further on1

ב אבל בשעת נפילה מאי דברי הכל פטור והא מדקאמר רבי יוחנן לקמן לא תימא מתניתין ר"מ היא דאמר נתקל פושע הוא מכלל דרבי מאיר מחייב

2 that we should not think that the Mishnah2

ג אלא מאי דברי הכל חייב והא מדקאמר ר' יוחנן לקמן לא תימא מתניתין ר"מ היא דאמר נתקל פושע הוא מכלל דפטרי רבנן

3 [there] follows the view of R. Meir who maintains that stumbling constitutes carelessness, implies that R. Meir imposes liability.3

ד אלא הא קמ"ל דמפקיר נזקיו דהכא הוא דפטרי רבנן דאנוס הוא אבל מפקיר נזקיו דעלמא מחייבי

4 What else [would you suggest? That there] be unanimity [imposing] liability? Surely the very statement made further on1

ה איתמר מפקיר נזקיו רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור

5 by R. Johanan [himself] that we should not think that the Mishnah2

ו לימא מאן דמחייב כר"מ ומאן דפטר כרבנן

6 [there] follows the view of R. Meir, implies that the Rabbis would exempt!3

ז אליבא דר"מ כ"ע לא פליג כי פליגי אליבא דרבנן מאן דפטר כרבנן ומאן דמחייב אמר לך אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבנן עד כאן לא פטרי רבנן אלא במפקיר נזקיו דהכא משום דאנוס הוא אבל מפקיר נזקיו דעלמא מחייבי

7 — Hence what he [R. Johanan] intends to convey to us is that abandoned nuisances have only in this connection been exempted from liability by the Rabbis since the very inception [of the nuisances]4

ח תסתיים דר"א הוא דאמר חייב דאמר רבי אלעזר משום רבי ישמעאל שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה תסתיים

8 was by accident, whereas abandoned nuisances in other circumstances involve liability [even according to the Rabbis].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The statement made by R. Johanan that it was regarding damage occasioned after the fall (of the pitcher) that there was a difference of opinion would thus mean that the difference of opinion between R. Meir and the other Rabbis was only where the inception of the nuisance was with a fall, i.e. with an accident, as where the nuisance had originally been wilfully exposed to the public there would be liability according to all opinions. ');">5

ט ומי אמר רבי אלעזר הכי והא אמר רבי אלעזר איפכא דתנן ההופך את הגלל ברה"ר והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו ואמר ר"א לא שנו אלא שנתכוין לזכות בהן אבל לא נתכוין לזכות בהן פטור אלמא מפקיר נזקיו פטור

9 It was stated: In the case of abandoned nuisances [causing damage], R. Johanan and R. Eleazar [differ]. One imposes liability and the other maintains exemption. May we not say that the one imposing liability follows the view of R. Meir,6

י אמר רב אדא בר אהבה שהחזירה למקומה אמר רבינא משל דרב אדא בר אהבה למה הדבר דומה למוצא בור מגולה וכסהו וחזר וגילהו

10 whereas the other, who maintains exemption follows that of the Rabbis?6

יא א"ל מר זוטרא בריה דרב מרי לרבינא מי דמי התם לא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון הכא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון

11 — As to R. Meir's view no one could dispute [that there should be liability].7

יב הא לא דמי אלא למוצא בור מגולה וטממה וחזר וחפרה דאסתלקו להו מעשה ראשון וקיימא לה ברשותו

12 Where they differ is as to the view of the Rabbis. The one who exempts does so because of the Rabbis,8

יג אלא אמר רב אשי כשהפכה לפחות משלשה

13 while the other who imposes liability can say to you, 'It is I who follow the view even of the Rabbis, for the Rabbis who declare abandoned nuisances exempt do so only in one particular connection, where the very inception [of the nuisances]9

יד ומאי דוחקיה דר"א לאוקמיה כגון שהפכה לפחות מג' וטעמא דכי נתכוין לזכות בה הא אין מתכוין לזכות בה לא לוקמה למעלה מג' ואע"ג דלא נתכוין לזכות בה חייב

14 had been by accident, whereas abandoned nuisances in other connections involve liability.' May it not be concluded that it was R. Eleazar who imposed liability? For R. Eleazar said in the name of R. Ishmael:10

טו אמר רבא מתני' קשיתיה מאי אריא הפך לתני הגביה אלא ש"מ כל הפך למטה משלשה הוא

15 There are two [laws dealing with] matters that are really not within the ownership of man but which are regarded by Scripture as if they were under his ownership. They are [the following]: Pit in public ground,11

טז ומדרבי אלעזר אמר חייב ר' יוחנן אמר פטור

16 and Leaven after midday [on Passover eve].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'from the sixth hour upwards', when in accordance with Pes. I. 4, it becomes prohibited for any use and is thus rendered ownerless, but for its destruction the original owner is still held responsible. ');">12

יז ומי א"ר יוחנן הכי והתנן המצניע את הקוץ ואת הזכוכית והגודר גדרו בקוצים וגדר שנפל לרשות הרבים והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו

17 It may indeed be concluded thus.13

יח ואמר רבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא במפריח אבל במצמצם פטור מצמצם מאי טעמא פטור לאו משום דהויא ליה בור ברשותו מכלל דחיובא דבור ברשות הרבים הוא אלמא מפקיר נזקיו חייב

18 But did R. Eleazar really say so? Did not R. Eleazar express himself to the contrary? For we have learnt;14

יט לא לעולם אימא לך מפקיר נזקיו פטור ומצמצם מ"ט פטור משום דאתמר עלה אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לפי שאין דרכן של בני אדם להתחכך בכתלים

19 'If a man turns up dung that had been lying on public ground and another person is [subsequently] injured thereby, there is liability for the damage.' And R. Eleazar thereupon said: This Mishnaic ruling applies only to one who [by turning over the dung] intended to acquire title to it. For if he had not intended to acquire title to it there would be exemption. Now, does not this prove that abandoned nuisances are exempt? — R. Adda b. Ahabah suggested [that the amendment made by R. Eleazar] referred to one who has restored the dung to its previous position.15

כ ומי אמר ר' יוחנן הכי והא א"ר יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה ותנן החופר בור ברה"ר ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב

20 Rabina [thus] said: The instance given by R. Adda b. Ahabah may have its equivalent in the case of one who, on coming across an open pit, covered it, but opened it up again. But Mar Zutra the son of R. Mari said to Rabina: What a comparison! In the latter case, [by merely covering the pit] the [evil] deed of the original [offender] has not yet been undone, whereas in the case before us [by removing the dung from its place] the [evil] deed of the original [offender] has been undone! May it not therefore [on the other hand] have its equivalent only in the case of one who, on coming across an open pit, filled it up [with earth] but dug it out again, where, since the nuisance created by the original [offender] had already been completely removed [by filling in the pit], it stands altogether under the responsibility of the new offender? — R. Ashi therefore suggested [that the amendment made by R. Eleazar] referred to one who turned over the dung within the first three [handbreadths]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to the principle of Labud, which is the legal consideration of separated parts as united, one substance is not regarded as removed from another unless a space of not less than three handbreadths separates them. ');">16

כא אלא לעולם רבי יוחנן אמר חייב

21 of the ground [in which case the nuisance created by the original offender is not yet considered in law as abated]. But what influenced R. Eleazar to make the [Mishnaic] ruling17

כב ומדרבי יוחנן אמר חייב ר"א אמר פטור והאמר ר"א

22 refer to one who turned over the dung within the first three [handbreadths of the ground], and thus to confine its application only to one who intended to acquire title to the dung,18 excluding thereby one who did not intend to acquire title to it? Why not indeed make the ruling refer to one who turned over the dung above the first three handbreadths, so that even where one did not intend to acquire title to it the liability should hold good? — Raba [thereupon] said: Because of a difficulty in the Mishnaic text17 [which occurred to him]: Why indeed have 'turning up' in the Mishnaic text and not simply 'raising,'19 if not to indicate that 'turning up' implies within the first three handbreadths [of the ground]. Now [then] that R. Eleazar was the one who maintained liability,20 R. Johanan would [of course] be the one who maintained exemption. But could R. Johanan really maintain this? Surely we have learnt: If a man hides thorns and broken glass [in public ground], or makes a fence of thorns, or if a man's fence falls upon public ground and damage results therefrom to another person, there is liability for the damage.21 And R. Johanan thereupon said: This Mishnaic ruling refers to a case where the thorns were projecting into the public thoroughfare. For if they were confined within private premises22 there would be exemption. Now, why should there be exemption in the case where they were confined within private premises if not because they would only constitute a nuisance on private premises? Does this then not imply that it is only a nuisance created upon public ground that involves liability, proving thus that abandoned nuisances do involve liability? — No, it may still be suggested that abandoned nuisances are exempt. The reason for the exemption in the case of thorns confined to private premises is, as it has already been stated in this connection,21 that R. Aha the son of R. Ika said: Because it is not the habit of men to rub themselves against walls.23 But again, could R. Johanan [really] maintain this?24 Surely R. Johanan stated:25 The halachah is in accordance with anonymous Mishnaic rulings. And we have learnt: If a man digs a pit in public ground, and an ox or ass falls in and dies, there is liability.26 [Does this not prove that there is liability for a pit dug in public ground?] — [It must] therefore [be concluded that] R. Johanan was indeed the one who maintained liability. Now then that R. Johanan was the one who maintained liability, R. Eleazar would [of course] be the one who maintained exemption. But did not R. Eleazar say

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